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Abstract 
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant 
mechanism design, which extends the stan­
dard game theoretic framework of mechanism 
design to allow for uncertainty about execu­
tion. Specifically, we define the problem of 
task allocation in which the private informa­
tion of the agents is not only their costs to 
attempt the tasks, but also their probabili­
ties of failure. For several different instances 
of this setting we present technical results, 
including positive ones in the form of mecha­
nisms that are incentive compatible, individ­
ually rational and efficient, and negative ones 
in the form of impossibility theorems. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen much activity at the interface 
of computer science and game theory, in particular in 
the area of Mechanism Design, or MD (e.g. (Parkes 
& Ungar 2000; Boutilier, Shoham, & Wellman 1997 ; 
Shoham & Tennenholtz 2001; Nisan & Ronen 2001)). 
A sub-area of game theory, MD is the science of craft­
ing protocols for self-interested agents, and as such is 
natural fodder for computer science in general and AI 
in particular. The uniqueness of the MD perspective is 
that it concentrates on protocols for non-cooperative 
agents. Indeed, traditional game theoretic work on 
MD focuses uniquely on the incentive aspects of the 
protocols. 
A promising application of MD to AI is the problem 
of task allocation among self-interested agents (see e.g. 
(Rosenschein & Zlotkin 1994)). When only the execu­
tion costs are taken into account, the task allocation 
problem allows standard mechanism design solutions. 
1This work was supported in part by DARPA grant 
F30602-00-2-0598. 
However, this setting does not take into consideration 
the possibility that agents might fail to complete their 
assigned tasks. When this possibility is added to the 
framework, existing results cease to apply. The goal 
of this paper is to investigate robustness to failures in 
the game theoretic framework in which each agent is 
rational and self-motivated. Specifically, we consider 
the design of protocols for agents which have not only 
private cost functions, but also privately-known prob­
abilities of failure. 
What criteria should such protocols meet? Traditional 
MD has a standard set of criteria for successful out­
comes, namely social efficiency (maximizing the sum 
of the agents' utilities), individual rationality (posi­
tive utility for all participants), and incentive com­
patibility (incentives for agents to reveal their pri­
vate information). Fault Tolerant Mechanism Design 
(FTMD) strives to satisfy these same goals; the key 
difference is that the agents have richer private infor­
mation (namely probability of failure, in addition to 
cost). As we will see, this extension presents novel 
challenges. 
It is important to distinguish between different pos­
sible types of failure. The focus of this paper is on 
failures that occur when agents make a full effort to 
complete their assigned tasks, but may fail. A more 
nefarious situation would be one in which agents may 
also fail deliberately when it is rational to do so. While 
we do not formally consider this possibility, we will re­
visit it at the end of the paper to explain why our 
results hold in this case as well. Finally, one can con­
sider the case in which there exist irrational agents 
whose actions (for example, intentional failures) are 
counter to their best interests. This is the most diffi­
cult type of failure to handle, because the presence of 
such agents can affect the strategy of rational agents, 
in addition to directly affecting the outcome. We leave 
this case to future work. 
It is helpful to consider a concrete example. Consider 
a network of links which are owned by selfish agents 
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(e.g. airline companies), and two distinguished nodes 
S and T in it. We allow multiple links between nodes 
so that more than one agent can provide the same ser­
vice (but only agent can be selected to do so). When 
an object is routed through a link, the owning agent 
incurs some cost. In addition, the agent may fail ( ac­
cording to some probability) to pass the object across 
the link (e.g., the object is lost in transit, or not deliv­
ered by a strict deadline). The costs and probabilities 
are privately known to their owners. Our goal is to 
design a mechanism (protocol) that will ensure that 
objects will be sent from S to T across the network in 
the most reliable and cost-effective way possible. 
To demonstrate the challenges encountered when fac­
ing such problems, consider even the simple case in 
which the network consists of only parallel links be­
tween SandT, and costs are all zero. A naive proto­
col would ask each agent for their probability, choose 
the most reliable agent (according to the declarations) 
and pay her a fixed, positive amount if she succeeds, 
and zero otherwise. Of course, in this case each agent 
will report a probability of one in order to selfishly 
maximize her own expected profit. 
In this paper we study progressively more complex 
task-allocation problems. The first problem that we 
study is one in which there is only one task. We use 
this setting both to show why standard MD solutions 
are not applicable and to present our basic technique 
in the form of a novel mechanism. After extending this 
technique to handle the case of multiple tasks without 
dependencies among them, we move to the general case 
of dependent tasks. Here, we prove an impossibility re­
sult when we demand incentive compatibility in dom­
inant strategies, and present a mechanism that solves 
in equilibrium the case of dependent tasks. Finally, 
we discuss the use of cost verification to significantly 
improve the revenue properties of the center. 
2 RELATED WORK 
The work presented in this paper integrates techniques 
of economic mechanism design (an introduction to MD 
can be found in (Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green 1995, 
chapter 23)) with studies of fault tolerant problem 
solving in computer science and AI. 
In particular, the technique used in our mechanism 
is similar to that of the Generalized Vickrey Auction 
(GVA) (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 197 1; Groves 1973) in 
that it aligns the utility of the agents with the overall 
welfare. This similarity is almost unavoidable, as this 
alignment is the only known general principle for solv­
ing mechanism design problems. However, because we 
allow for the possibility of failures, we will need to 
change the GVA in a significant way in order for our 
mechanism to achieve this alignment. 
Because we have added probabilities to our setting, our 
mechanisms may seem to be related to the Expected 
Externality Mechanism (or d'AGVA) (d'Aspremont & 
Gerard-Varet 1979), but there are key differences. In 
the setting of d'AGVA, the types of the agents are 
drawn (independently) from a distribution which is 
assumed to be common knowledge among the par­
ticipants. The two key differences in our setting are 
that no such common knowledge assumption is made 
and that the solution concepts which we guarantee are 
stronger than that of d'AGVA. 
A recent paper (Eliaz 2002) also considers failures in 
MD, but solves a different problem. This work assumes 
that agents know the types of all other rational agents 
and also limits the failures that can occur by bounding 
the number of irrational agents. 
Finally, the design of protocols which are robust to 
failures has a long tradition in computer science (for a 
survey, see (Linial 1994)). Work in this area, however, 
almost always assumes a set of agents that are by and 
large cooperative and adhere to a central protocol, ex­
cept for some subset of malicious agents who may do 
anything to disrupt the protocol. In MD settings, the 
participants fit neither of these classes, but are simply 
self-interested. 
3 A BASIC MODEL 
In this section we describe our basic model and no­
tation, which will be modified later to handle specific 
settings. 
In a FTMD problem, we have a set of t tasks T = 
{1, . . .  , t} and a set N = {1, . . . , n} of self-interested 
agents to which the tasks can be assigned. We also 
have a center M who assigns tasks to agents and pays 
them for their work. The center and the agents will 
collectively be called the participants. 
Each agent i has, for each task j, a probability Pii E 
[0, 1] of successfully completing task j, and a nonnega­
tive cost Cij E �+ of attempting the task. We assume 
that the cost of attempting a task does not depend on 
the success of the attempt. We use Pi = (pi!, . . .  , pit) 
for the set of all probabilities for agent i, and use 
p = (p1, . . .  ,pn) to represent the set of probability vec­
tors for all agents. We use corresponding notation for 
Ci and c. The pair ()i = (pi, ci) is called the agent's type 
and is privately known to the agent. Each agent is as­
signed a set Ai of tasks, and her cost to attempt the 
set is: Ci(Ai) = I:jEA, Cij· We define()= (B1, . . .  , Bn) 
as the vector of types for all agents. 
We use a completion vector 11- E { 0, 1 }I to denote which 
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tasks have been completed. The function V: {0, 1 }t --> 
w+ defines the center's nonnegative valuation for each 
possible completion vector. For now, we assume that 
the center has a non-combinatorial valuation for a set 
of tasks. That is, the value of a set of tasks is the sum 
of the values for the individual tasks. We also assume 
that V(J.L) 2': 0 for all J.L and that V(O, . . .  , 0) = 0. 
An assignment vector A = (A 1, . . .  , An) and a vec­
tor of agent probabilities p together induce a proba­
bility distribution over the completion vector which 
we denote by [J.LIA, p]. Given an assignment A, a 
type vector () and a completion vector J.L, we de­
fine the welfare of the participants as W(A, c, J.L) = 
V(J.L) - I;; c;(A;). We define the expected welfare as 
W(A, c, p) = E[I'(A,p] [W(A, c, J.L)]. The goal of the cen­
ter is to design a mechanism (protocol) that maximizes 
this expected welfare. 
We assume that each task can be assigned only once. 
The center does not have to allocate all the tasks. For 
notational convenience we assume that all the non­
allocated tasks are assigned to a dummy agent 0 which 
for each task has zero probability of success and zero 
cost to attempt. 
When an agent i is assigned a set A; of tasks, and 
is paid R;, her utility equals u; = R; - c;(A;). Since 
our setting is stochastic by nature, an agent can do 
no better than to maximize her expected utility, ii.;, 
calculated before any task is attempted. This term 
thus depends on the true probabilities of success of 
the agents, as explained below. 
Throughout the paper we shall use the following vector 
notations: The subscript -i on a vector denotes that 
the term for agent i has been omitted from the vector. 
For example, P-i = (pi, . . .  ,p;-J,Pi+l, ... ,Pn)· The 
omitted term can be combined with such a vector by 
using the following notation: p = (p;, p-;). We de­
note by J.L; the completion vector for agent i (i.e. we 
have 1 for each task accomplished by agent i and 0 for 
each one either failed by her or not assigned to her). 
The definitions for J.L-i and (J.L;, J.L-;) follow similarly. 
Sometimes we will use J.Li in place of p;. Since both 
vectors are of the same form, a 0 or 1 for task t 1 in J.L; 
becomes the probability of successfully completing t1. 
3.1 Mechanisms 
A mechanism is a protocol that decides how to assign 
the tasks to the agents and how much each agent is 
paid. The simplest type of mechanisms are ones in 
which the agents are simply required to report their 
types. (Of course they may lie!) The revelation prin­
ciple (see e.g. (Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green 1995 , 
p. 871)) tells us that we can, w.l.o.g., restrict ourselves 
to such mechanisms. 
We denote by the vector 0 the types declared by the 
agents . A mechanism is thus defined by a pair g = 
(A(O), R(O, J.L)) such that: 
• A(O) = (A1(i}), ... ,An(O)) is an assignment func­
tion. It takes a declaration vector and returns an 
assignment of the tasks to the agents. 
• R(O) = (RJ(O,J.L), ... ,Rn(O,J.L)) is the payment 
function. 
In our motivating example, a type (); would correspond 
to agent i's costs and probabilities of success on each 
of her edges. 
In our protocol, the center first asks each agent to de­
clare her type. We call an agent truthful if she reveals 
her true type to the center. Based on these declara­
tions the center first computes the assignment A(O). 
Then, the agents execute their tasks. Finally, the cen­
ter pays the agents. Note that these payments de­
pend on the set of tasks which were accomplished. We 
assume that the agents always attempt each task to 
which they are assigned. In our discussion section, we 
explain why this is a valid assumption. 
In the above protocol, 
t 1s: u;(c;, 0;, 0_;, J.L) 
and her expected utility 
E[,(A(O),p] [u; (c;, 0;, 0_;, J.L)]. 
the utility of agent 
R;(O,J.L) - c;(A;(O)), 
IS: ii.;(C;, 0;, 0_;, p) = 
The main difference between mechanism design prob­
lems and the usual algorithmic problems is that the 
participating agents may manipulate the given proto­
col if it is beneficial for them to do so. We therefore 
need to design protocols that fulfill our objectives even 
though the agents behave selfishly. We thus require 
our mechanism to satisfy the following standard prop-
erties: 
Individual rationality (IR) holds when truthful agents 
are guaranteed to have non-negative expected utility. 
Formally, for all i, () and 0_;: ii.;(c;, ();, O_;, p) 2': 0. 
Incentive compatibility (IC) holds when it is a domi­
nant strategy for each agent to declare her type truth­
fully. Formally, this condition holds, when for all i, (), 
();, and 0_;: ii.;(c;, B;, O-;, p) :2: ii.; (c;, B;, o_;, p). This 
means that the expected utility of the agent ( condi­
tional on her own probability of success) is maximized 
when the agent reports her true type. 
A mechanism is called socially efficient (SE) if the cho­
sen assignment maximizes the expected welfare W. 
The fact that W depends on the true types of the 
agents underscores the importance of IC, which allows 
the center to correctly assume that 0 = (). 
--; 
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Individual rationality for the center (CR) holds if the 
center's utility UM = V(J.L)-Li Ri(-) is always nonneg­
ative. CR is an extension of the standard mechanism 
design requirement of weak budget balance to account 
for the center's utility for outcomes. 
A final goal is no free riders (NFR), which holds if all 
agents not assigned any task have a revenue of zero. 
4 SINGLE TASK SETTING 
We will start with the special case of a single task 
to show our basic technique to handle the possibility 
of failures in MD. For expositional purposes, we will 
analyze two restricted settings (the first restricts prob­
abilities of success to be one, and the second restricts 
costs to be zero), before formally proving properties 
about our mechanism in the full single task setting. 
Because there is only one task, we can simplify the 
notation. We let Ci and Pi denote CiJ and Pil, re­
spectively. Similarly, we let V = V((1)) , which is the 
value that the center assigns to the completion of the 
task. For each mechanism, we will use the index [1] 
to denote the agent selected to attempt the task (e.g., 
P[l] denotes the selected agent's probability of success). 
The subscript [2] then refers to the agent who would 
be selected as the service provider if agent [1] had not 
participated. 
4.1 CASE 1: ONLY COSTS 
When we do not allow for failures (that is, 'Vi Pi = 1) , 
the goal of social efficiency reduces to assigning the 
task the lowest-cost agent. This simplified problem 
can be solved using a second-price auction (which is a 
specific case of GVA). Each agent declares a cost, the 
task is assigned to the agent with the lowest cost, and 
that agent is paid the second-lowest submitted cost. 
4.2 CASE 2: ONLY FAILURES 
We now reduce the problem in a different way, by as­
suming all costs to be zero (\;/i ci = 0). In this case, the 
main goal is to allocate the task to the most reliable 
agent. Interestingly, we cannot use a straightforward 
application of the GVA for this case. Such a mech­
anism would ask each agent to declare a probability 
of success and assign the task to the agent with the 
highest declared probability. It would set the revenue 
function for all agents not assigned the task to be 0, 
while the service provider would be paid the amount 
by which her presence increases the welfare of the other 
agents and the center: P[l] V- .P121 V. Obviously, such 
a mechanism is not incentive compatible, because the 
payment to the service provider depends on her own 
declared type! Since there are no costs, each agent 
would have a dominant strategy to declare her proba­
bility of success as one. 2 
Thus, we need to fundamentally alter our payment 
rule so that it depends on the outcome of the attempt, 
and not solely on the declared types, as it does in the 
GVA. The key difference in our setting that forces this 
change is the fact that the true type of an agent now 
directly affects the outcome, whereas in the standard 
MD setting the type of an agent only affects her pref­
erences over outcomes. We accomplish our goals by 
replacing P[l] with an indicator function that is 1 if 
the task was completed, and 0 otherwise. The pay­
ment rule for the service provider is now V - .P121 V if 
she succeeds and -.P121 V if she fails. Just as in the 
previous setting, the service provider is the only agent 
who has positive utility for attempting the task with 
the corresponding payment rule. The expected utility 
for agent i would be V ·(Pi· (1- P[2J)- (1-p;) · P[2j)· 
This expression is positive for the agent iff Pi > P[2], 
which is only true for the service provider. 
4.3 CASE 3: COSTS AND FAILURES 
We now consider the case of one task with both costs 
and failures. 
We introduce the following definition that we will use 
throughout the paper: Given an agent i we denote by 
W.:'.i(c-;,P-i) the optimal (declared) expected welfare 
when tasks cannot be allocated to agent i. In the single 
task case it is maxN;(PJ · V- c1 ) . Now we can define 
the mechanism. 
Single Task Mechanism: 
Assignment The mechanism chooses an agent i E 
{0, .. . , n} that maximizes the (declared) expected 
welfare w =Pi· v- c;. 
Payment The payment to all agents not assigned a 
task is always zero. The payment to the "winner" 
i is defined as follows: 
If i succeeds 
If i fails 
Using P[2] and c121 to denote the probability and the 
cost of the "second best" agent, the payment to agent 
i when she succeeds is (V-P[2] · V + c121) and when she 
fails is ( -p121 · V +c[2J)· Note that W* is never negative 
2In fact, this would be true for any payment rule for 
which an agent's payment is always nonnegative, which is 
the reason why we require our goals (such as IC and IR) to 
be satisfied for the expected utility of the agent, and not 
for ex post utility. 
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because the center will never make an assignment that 
yields an expected loss for the system. 
For example, suppose we have three agents with the 
types listed in Table 1. Let V be 210. If the agents are 
truthful, then the winner is agent 3. If agent 3 did not 
exist, the optimal expected welfare would be w .:3 = 
210 - 100 = 110, because the task would be assigned 
to agent 2. The payment for agent 3 is therefore 210-
110 = 100 if she succeeds and -110 if she fails. Agent 
3's own costs are 60, and thus her expected utility is 
(100- 60) . 0.9 + ( -110- 60) . 0.1 = 19. 
Agent C; Pi 
1 30 0.5 
2 100 1.0 
3 60 0.9 
Table 1: A Single Task Example 
Before we prove the properties of this mechanism, let 
us introduce two definitions that we shall use through­
out that paper. Given an agent i, we define the 
welfare of the other participants W_;(A, c_;, 11-) = 
V(Jl-) - l:J,<i cJ(AJ)· Note that W_;(A,c_;,Jl-) = W (A, c;, 11-) + c; (A;). We define the expected welfare 
for the other participants as W_;(A,c_;, (P-;,Jl-;)) = 
E[I'-,[A,p-,J[W-;(A,c_;,(Jl-;,Ji--i))]. This is the ex­
pected welfare of all the other participants (including 
the center) when the allocation is A and agent i has 
completed exactly the set of tasks defined by Jl-i· 
It is not difficult to see that the payment R; 
of each agent i equals W_;(A,c_;,(P-;,Jl-;)) -
W.:;(c-;,fi-;J. Her expected utility is therefore 
u; = -c;(A;) + E[!LdA,,p,]W-;(A,c_;,(p_;,Jl-;)) -
w .:;(c-;,p-;). Since the distribution [11-]A, (p;,fi-;)] 
equals [Jl-;]A;,p;] · [Jl--;]A,p_;], we get that R; = 
W(A, (c;, c_;), (p;,p_;))- w.:;(c-;,fi-i)· This means 
that each agent gets paid her contribution to the ex­
pected welfare of the other participants. 
Theorem 1 The Single Task mechanism satisfies IR, 
IC, CR, SE, and NFR. 
Proof: 
We will prove each property separately. 
1. Individual Rationality 
We need to prove that the expected utility 
of a truthful agent is always non negative. 
When agent i is truthful her expected util­
ity is U; = W(A((I1;, 11�;)), (c;, c_;), (p;,fi-;)) -
w .:;(c_;,fi-;J. By the optimality of A(.), the sec­
ond term quantifies the optimal welfare that can 
be obtained when the types of the other agents are 
11 �i and i does not exist. Similarly, the first term 
quantifies the optimal welfare when the types of 
the other agents are 11 �i and the type of agent i 
is the true one 11;. Since i can only improve the 
total welfare, we proved our claim. 
2. Incentive Compatibility 
We need to prove that the expected utility of each 
agent i is maximized when she is truthful. Let 
11 �i denote the declarations of the other agents. 
As before, when the agent is truthful her util­
ity is U; = W(A((I1;, 11�;)), (c;, c_;), (p;,p_;)) -
W.:;(c_;,fi-;). Consider the case where the agent 
reports another type 11;. This results in an as­
signment A'. The utility of agent i in this case is 
u; = W(A', (c;, c_;), (p;,fi-;))- W.:;(c-;,fi-;) 
Assume by contradiction that u; > u;. 
This means that W(A', (c;,L;), (p;,fi-;)) > 
W(A((I1;, 11�;) ), (c;, c_;), (p;, fi-d ). However this 
contradicts the optimality of A((l1;, 11�;)). 
3. Individual Rationality for the Center Let 
agent i be the winner. We need to show that 
the utility for the center is always non nega­
tive. There are two cases. When agent i suc­
ceeds we have UM = v- (V- w .:;(C-i,P-i)) = 
W.:; (c_;,]L;)) ?: 0. When i fails, the value is zero 
and thus UM = w .:;(C-i,P-i)) ?: 0. 
4. Social Efficiency Immediate from IC and the 
definition of A(.). 
5. No Free Riders Immediate from the definition 
of the payment rule. • 
5 MULTIPLE TASKS 
We now return to the original setting presented in this 
paper, consisting of t tasks for which the center has 
a non-combinatorial valuation (that is, the value for a 
set of tasks is equal to the sum of the values for the 
individual tasks) . Because the setting disallows any 
interaction between tasks, we can construct a mecha­
nism that satisfies all of our goals by generalizing the 
Single Task Mechanism. 
Multiple Task Mechanism: 
Assignment The chosen assignment A maximizes 
the (declared) expected welfare W(A,c,p) = 
EII'IA,pJ[W(A, c, J.L)]. 
Payment The payment to each agent i is defined 
according to her completion vector: R; = 
W_;(A, c_i, (fi-;, Jl-;))- 'W_:Jc-;,fi-d 
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In other words, each agent is paid according to her 
contribution to the welfare of the other participants. 
Proposition 2 The Multiple Task mechanism satis­
fies IC, IR, SE, CR, and NFR. 
The proof is similar to the single task case and is omit­
ted. Note that the theorem holds even when the cost 
functions and probabilities of success have a combina­
torial nature. 
5.1 COMBINATORIAL V 
We now consider the setting in which the center's valu­
ation V ( · ) can be any monotone function of the tasks. 
Unfortunately, in this setting, it is impossible to satisfy 
all our goals simultaneously. 
Theorem 3 When V is combinatorial, there does not 
exist a mechanism that satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE 
for any n 2: 2 and t ;::: 2. 
Intuitively it is enough to consider the following case 
which no mechanism is able to solve. There are two 
tasks, each of which can only be completed by one 
agent (and, this one agent is different for the two 
tasks). The center only has a positive value (call it 
x) for both tasks being completed. Since both agents 
add a value of x to the system, they can each extract 
close to x from the center, causing the center to pay 
double for the utility of x he will gain from the com­
pletion of the task. Due to space constraints, we omit 
the formal proof of this theorem. 
However, despite the possibility of failures we can 
maintain the desired properties other than CR using 
the same mechanism as before. 
Theorem 4 The Multiple Task mechanism satisfies 
IC, IR, SE, and NFR, even when V is combinatorial. 
Again, we omit the proof. Intuitively, IC, IR, and NFR 
are not affected by a combinatorial V because they are 
only properties of the agents, and SE still follows from 
IC and the definition of A(-). 
5.2 DEPENDENCIES 
We now return to the case of non-combinatorial valu­
ation V (-) , and analyze a different extension: depen­
dencies between the tasks. 
Consider our motivating example of a network of 
flights. A natural example of a task dependency would 
be an object that could not be carried over the edge 
(b, c) before being carried over (a, b). 
Formally, we say that a task j is dependent on a set s 
of tasks if j cannot be attempted unless all tasks in s 
were successfully finished. We assume that there are 
no dependency cycles. The tasks now are executed ac­
cording to a topological order. Nate that if a task can­
not be attempted, the agent assigned that task does 
not incur the costs of attempting it. 3 
However, the presence of dependencies, just like the 
presence of a combinatorial V, makes it impossible to 
satisfy IC, IR, CR, and SE. 
Theorem 5 When dependencies exist between tasks, 
there does not exist a mechanism that satisfies IC, IR, 
CR, and SE for any n 2: 2 and t 2: 2. 
Proof: Proof by induction. We first show that a 
mechanism cannot satisfy IC, IR, CR, and SE for the 
base case of n = t = 2. The inductive step then shows 
that increasing either n or t cannot alter this impossi­
bility result. 
Base Case: We prove the base case by contradiction. 
Assume that there exists a mechanism that satisfies 
IC, IR, CR, and SE. This implies that it satisfies these 
properties for all possible instances, where we define a 
instance as a particular set of agent types and decla­
rations, task dependencies, and a V function. We will 
use 3 possible instances in order to derive properties 
that must hold in the mechanism, but lead to a con­
tradiction. The constants in these instances are that 
task 2 is dependent on task 1 and that the center has 
value of 5 for task 2 being completed, but no value for 
the completion of task 1 in isolation. The five types 
that we will use, 01, 0�, 0� , 02, and 0�, are defined in 
Table 2 (the final type, Oe, will be used later in the 
inductive step). 
01 : Pu = 1 cu = 2 P12 = 1 C12 = 1 
0'. 1 . P�1- 1 c�1- 2 P�2 - 0 c�2- 0 
B" . 1 . P{l = 1 c{1 = 0 P{2 = 1 c�2 = 4 
02: P21 = 0 C21 = 1 P22 = 0 C12 = 0 
B'. 2 . P�n = 1 c�1- 1 P�2 = 0 c�2- 0 
Oe: Pel = 0 Ce! = 1 Pe2 = 0 Ce2 = 1 
Table 2: Agent Types for Theorem 5. 
Instance 1: The true types are 01 and 82, and the 
declared types are 01 and 0�. To satisfy SE, task 1 is 
assigned to agent 2, and task 2 to agent 1. That is, 
A1(01,0�) = (0, 1) and A2(81,0�) = (1, 0). Since agent 
2's true type is 82, she will fail on task 1, preventing 
task 2 from being attempted. Thus, M = (0, 0) with 
probability 1. The expected utility for agent l is then: 
ul(cl , Bl , B�, p) = R1((81,B�),(O,O)) 
3This is the reason why the current setting is not a spe­
cial case of the combinatorial V setting where the valuation 
of a set of tasks is the valuation of the subset for which the 
prerequisites are met. 
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Instance 2: The true types are 11� and 1l2, and the de­
clared types are 111, and 112. Thus, the only difference 
from instance 1 is agent 1 's true type which is insignif­
icant, because agent 1 never gets to attempt a task. 
Thus, we have a similar expected utility function: 
ilt(c�,11t,112, (p�,p2)) = Rt((11t,112), (0,0)) 
Instance 3: The true types are 11� and 112, and the de­
clared types are 11�, and 112. Now we have also changed 
agent 1 's declared type to 11�. Both tasks will be al­
located to the null agent: At(11�,B2) = A2(B�,B2) = 
(0, 0). Therefore, /l = (0, 0) still holds with probabil­
ity 1, and we get the following equations: 
fit(c�,B�,112,(p�,p2)) = RI((B�,B2),(0,0)) 
u2(c2,B2,11�, (p�,p2)) = R2((B�,e;),(O,o)) 
If R2((B�,B2), (0,0)) < 0, then IR would be violated 
if e; were indeed the true type of agent 2, because 
the assignment function would be the same. Since the 
center thus receives no payment from agent 2, and it 
never gains any utility from completed tasks, the CR 
condition requires that RI((B�, e;), (0, 0)) ::; 0. Thus, 
ul(c�,B�,e;, (p�,p2))::; o. 
Notice that if agent 1 lied in this instance and de­
clared her type to be 81, then we are in instance 2. 
So, to preserve IC, agent 1 must not have incentive 
to make this false declaration. u I ( Ct' Bl' e;' (p�' P2)) = 
Rt((BI,B2), (0,0))::; fit(c�,B�,B2, (p�,p2))::; 0. 
Instance 1: Now we return to instance 1. Having 
shown that R1((B1, B2), (0,0))::; 0, we know that when 
agent 1 declares truthfully in this instance, her ex­
pected utility will be: ul(c�,B1,B2,p)::; 0. 
We will now show that agent 1 must have a pos­
itive expected utility if she falsely declares 11�. 
In this case, both tasks are assigned to agent 
1. That is, A1(B�,B2) = (1,  1). We know that 
R2((B�,B2),(1,1)) 2: 4  by IR for agent 1, because if 
B� were agent 1 's true type, then both tasks would be 
completed and agent 1 would incur a cost of 4. 
We now know that if agent 1 falsely declares B� in in­
stance 1: fit(c�,B�,B2,p) = Rt((B�,B2), (1, 1)) - (cu + 
c12) ;::: 4- 3 2: 1. Thus, agent 1 has incentive to falsely 
declare B� in instance 1, violating IC. Thus, we have 
reached a contradiction and completed the proof of the 
base case. 
Inductive Step: We now prove the inductive step, 
which consists of two parts: incrementing n and in­
crementing t .  In each case, the inductive hypothesis 
is that no mechanism satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE for 
n = x and t = y, where x, y 2: 2. 
Part 1: For the first case, we must show that no 
mechanism exists that satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE 
for n = x + 1 and t = y, which we will prove by con­
tradiction. Assume that such a mechanism does exist. 
There is a one-to-one mapping from every instance in 
which n = x and t = y to an instance that only dif­
fers in the addition of an "extra" agent who truthfully 
declares her type Be. Since such an instance satisfies 
n = x + 1 and t = y, our mechanism must satisfy 
IC, IR, CR, and SE for this instance. Because of SE, 
this mechanism can never assign the task to the extra 
agent. Because of IR, this mechanism can never re­
ceive a positive payment from the extra agent. Since 
in each instance the only effect that the extra agent can 
have on the mechanism is to receive a payment from 
the center, we can transform this mechanism into one 
which satisfies IC, IR, CR, and SE for all instances 
where n = x and t = y by simply removing the rev­
enue function and assignment function for the extra 
agent, contradicting the inductive hypothesis. 
Part 2: For the second case, we need to show that no 
mechanism can satisfy IC, IR, CR, and SE for n = x 
and t = y + 1. We use a similar proof by contradiction, 
starting from the assumption that such a mechanism 
does exist. There is a one-to-one mapping from every 
instance in which n = x and t = y to an instance of 
n = x and t = y+ 1 through the addition of an "extra" 
task te that is not involved in any dependencies and for 
which the center has no value for its completion. By 
SE, if a satisfying mechanism exists, then there exists 
a satisfying mechanism that always assigns this task to 
the dummy agent (recall that this is equivalent to not 
assigning the task). We can transform this mechanism 
into one which satisfies our goals for n = x and t = y 
by simply removing the assignment of te to the dummy 
agent. Once again, we have contradicted the inductive 
hypothesis, and the proof is complete. • 
Interestingly, by slightly altering our mechanism we 
can solve the problem in an equilibrium. 
Equilibrium Multiple Task Mechanism: 
Assignment The chosen assignment A maximizes 
the (declared) expected welfare W(A, c, p) = 
E[I'[A,fi] [W(A, c, /1)]. 
Payment The payment to each agent i is defined 
according to her completion vector: Ri 
w_i(A, c_i, Ill- w.:i(c-i,fi-i) 
The only difference from the Multiple Task Mecha­
nism is that the first term of the payment rule uses 
the actual completion vector, instead of the distribu­
tion induced by the declaration of the other agents. As 
a result, our properties are satisfied only as an equilib­
rium: if all agents declare truthfully, then no agent has 
incentive to deviate to a different declaration. While 
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there is no formal name for this type of equilibrium, it 
is similar in spirit to a Nash equilibrium, but techni­
cally different because there is no common knowledge 
of the game (since privately-known types affect the 
utility of other agents). It is also similar to a Bayes­
Nash equilibrium, but much stronger because it holds 
regardless of agent beliefs about the prior distributions 
for the types of the other agents. We define Equilib­
rium IC to hold if truth-telling is such an equilibrium. 
Equilibrium IR and SE are defined similarly. 
Theorem 6 The Equilibrium Multiple Task Mecha­
nism satisfies NFR, Equilibrium IC, Equilibrium IR, 
and Equilibrium SE, even when dependencies exist. 
6 C OST VERIFICATION 
A practical drawback of our mechanisms is that the 
payments (or fines) may be very large, especially when 
service provider is far more efficient than the other 
agents. Also, since CR is not satisfied in our most 
general settings, the designer has to take a risk. 
Previous work (Nisan & Ronen 2001) has stressed the 
importance of ex post verification. It showed that 
when the designer can verify the costs and the actions 
of the agents after the work was done, the power of 
the designer increases dramatically. All of our previ­
ous constructions have corresponding versions that use 
verification. The main advantage of these mechanisms 
is that the payments can be normalized by any linear 
function, thus making the potential losses more rea­
sonable for both the agents and the center. Due to 
space constraints we omit these constructions. 
7 DISC USSION & FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we studied task allocation problems in 
which agents may fail to complete their assigned tasks. 
For the settings we considered (single task, multi­
ple tasks with combinatorial properties, and multiple 
tasks with dependencies) we provided either a mecha­
nism that satisfies our goals or an impossibility result. 
It is worth pointing out that all of the results in this pa­
per hold when we expand the set of possible failures to 
include rational, intentional failures, which occur when 
an agent increases her utility by not attempting an as­
signed task (and thus not incurring the corresponding 
cost). Modelling this possibility would complicate our 
model without changing any of our results. Intuitively, 
our positive results continue to hold because the pay­
ment rule aligns an agent's utility with the welfare of 
the system. If failing to attempt some subset of the 
assigned tasks would increase the welfare, then these 
tasks would not have been assigned to any agent. Ob-
viously, all impossibility results would still hold when 
we expand the set of possible actions for the agents. 
Many interesting directions stem from this work. Two 
possibilities are retrying tasks after a failure or allow­
ing multiple agents to attempt the same task in par­
allel. The computation of our allocation and payment 
rules presents non-trivial algorithmic problems. Also, 
the payment properties for the center may be further 
investigated, especially in settings where CR must be 
sacrificed to satisfy our other goals. 
Finally, we believe that the most important future 
work will be to consider a wider range of possible 
failures, and to discover new mechanisms to overcome 
them. In particular, we would like to explore the case 
in which agents may fail maliciously or irrationally. 
For this case, even developing a reasonable model of 
the setting provides a major challenge. 
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